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it has been held that a court will take judicial notice of the regulation
and of the statute it was issued pursuant to. 68 Even so, it is still necessary to prove proximate cause. 69 With the possible applications of such
rulings in cases like this, attorneys most assuredly will want to determine whether or not the toy the child was injured by was subject to
any regulation made pursuant to this act.
To conclude, it appears that the Child Protection and Toy Safety
Act of 1969 has definite applications to the area of commerce as evidenced by the instant case, and, it would appear to have some practical
impact in a certain class of tort action.7 0 In either event, this case provides evidence that courts will not hesitate to consider the intent and
policy behind the act in enforcing action consistent with the preservation of safety for children.
Robert Morrison

CRIMINAL LAW-GuILTY PLEAS-WHERE STRONG EVIDENCE OF
ACTUAL GUILT SUBSTANTIALLY NEGATED DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF
INNOCENCE AND PROVIDED STRONG FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE GUILTY
PLEA, DEFENDANT

BEING REPRESENTED BY COMPETENT COUNSEL,
COURT COMMITTED No CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR IN ACCEPTING GUILTY
PLEA DESPITE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INNOCENCE AND FEAR OF
DEATH PENALTY, AND SUCH WAS VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY

PLEADED. North Carolinav. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L.
Ed.2d 162 (1970).
Defendant was indicted for the capital crime of first degree murder.
North Carolina law, at time of pleading, provided a maximum penalty
of life imprisonment if a guilty plea was entered. This was lower than
the maximum penalty authorized if a verdict of guilty by a jury.,
There were no eye witnesses to the crime but evidence showed circumstantial guilt. Testimony elicited before the plea of guilty was accepted
indicated that shortly before the killing defendant left his house with
68 United States v. Spence, 425 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1970). The court took judicial notice
of a regulation issued by the Secretary of HEW under 21 U.S.C.A. § 360 (Supp. 1970)
which made LSD come under the act prohibiting the sale, delivering, and disposing of it.
69 See, e.g., Shafer v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 335 F.2d 932,
935 (9th Cir. 1964).
70 The manufacturer would also be very interested in both aspects of the application of
the regulations.
1 The North Carolina statute permitting guilty pleas in capital cases was repealed in
1969. N.C. GEN. STAT. 15-162.1 repealed (Supp. 1969). Such laws having differentiation in
punishment were held unconstitutional in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.
Ct. 1209, 20 L. Ed.2d 138 (1968). See also Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S. Ct.
1458, 25 L. Ed.2d 785 (1970).
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a gun and stated his intention to kill the victim. Witnesses also stated
that the defendant returned home later with the declaration that he
had carried out the killing. Faced with strong evidence of guilt and no
substantial evidentiary support for a claim of innocence, defendant's
attorney recommended that he plead guilty. Defendant took the stand
and testified that he had not committed the murder but that he was
pleading guilty because he faced the threat of a death penalty if a jury
decided his guilt. The prosecutor agreed to accept a plea of guilty to
a charge of second-degree murder and the trial court accepted defendant's guilty plea, sentencing him to the maximum punishment of
thirty years. Defendant sought post-conviction relief claiming his plea
of guilty was invalid because it was the product of fear and coercion
and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. On appeal, a
divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the
ground the plea was made involuntarily.2 Held-Vacated and remanded.
Where strong evidence of actual guilt substantially negated defendant's
claim of innocence and provided strong factual basis for the guilty
plea, defendant being represented by competent counsel, court committed no constitutional error in accepting guilty plea despite defendant's claim of innocence and fear of death penalty, and such was
voluntarily and intelligently pleaded.
A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits the accused did the various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains
3
but to give judgment and determine the proper punishment.
A valid guilty plea is a waiver of several fundamental constitutional
rights: all nonjurisdictional defects, 4 trial by jury, 5 right of confrontation,6 right to contest the admissibility of evidence 7 and privilege
against self-incrimination. 8 As stated by Judge Duniway of the Ninth
2 Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968), relying on United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 20 L. Ed.2d 138 (1968). In Jackson, the Court held
that a statute which made the risk of death the price of a jury trial was unconstitutional
because it imposed an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right
and the plea could not be voluntary since result of fear of death.
8 Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S. Ct. 582, 583, 71 L. Ed. 1009, 1012
(1927).
4 Rice v. United States, 420 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 910, 90 S. Ct.
1705, 26 L. Ed.2d 70 (1969). Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 915, 86 S. Ct. 906, 15 L. Ed.2d 669 (1966).
5 Donnelly v. United States, 185 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 949, 71
S. Ct. 528, 95 L. Ed. 684 (1951). See generally on right of trial by jury Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed.2d 491 (1968), rehearing denied, 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.
Ct. 2270, 20 L. Ed.2d 1412 (1968).
6 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed.2d 274 (1969). See generally
on right of confrontation Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed.2d 923
(1965).
7 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed.2d 763 (1970). Caveat:
State law may permit a defendant to challenge the admissibility of a confession even if
plea of guilty is entered. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. 813-g (McKinney Supp. 1970).
8 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed.2d 418 (1969).
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Circuit, "A guilty plea ... is the most conclusive form of self-incrimination."9 It admits the existence of all incriminating facts necessary
to establish guilt' and the introduction of evidence is only to enable

the judge or jury to intelligently assess punishment. A plea of guilty
shall not be accepted by the courts unless made voluntarily after proper
advice and with full understanding of the consequences."' Due to the
serious implications and results of a guilty plea, the courts have continually strived to establish a standard to determine the voluntariness

of a guilty plea. One such standard was defined by Judge Tuttle of
the Fifth Circuit:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature
improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's
2
business (e.g. bribes).1

It is reversible error for a court to accept a guilty plea without an

affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.'1
These requirements of a valid guilty plea were incorporated into
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with the consent
of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a
plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea . . . without first
addressing the defendant personally and determining that the
plea is made voluntarily, with the understanding of the nature
of the charge and the consequence of the plea ... the court shall
9 United States v. Wells, 430 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1970).
10 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S. Ct. 510, 513, 7 L. Ed.2d 473,
477 (1962). Caveat: There must, however, be sufficient evidence to show a factual basis
for the plea before it is acceptable. In Texas, there are different requirements as to the
necessity of introducing evidence by the State depending on whether the plea in a felony
case is before the judge or jury. If the plea is in a case where a jury is waived, Tax.
CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15 (1965) requires that the state introduce evidence showing
guilt. Watson v. State, 363 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963). If the guilty plea is before
a jury, evidence is not necessary except to enable jury to establish punishment. Reyna v.
State, 434 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). However, right to have evidence submitted
to corroborate plea of guilty is solely a creature of Texas statute and is not a violation
of federal constitutional guarantees if state does not adhere to the statute and introduce
evidence. Hendrick v. Beto, 253 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Tex. 1965), af'd 360 F.2d 618 (5th Cir.
1966).
11 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S. Ct. 510, 513, 7 L. Ed.2d 473, 478
(1962). Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S. Ct. 582, 583, 71 L. Ed. 1009
(1927).
12 Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572, n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on
other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S.Ct. 563, 2 L. Ed.2d 579 (1958).
13 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 247, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1714, 23 L. Ed.2d 274, 279 (1969).
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unless it is satisfied that
not enter judgment upon a plea of guilty
4
there is a factual basis for the plea.1
The purpose of Rule 11 is to insure that an accused is appraised of the
significant effects of his plea so that his decision to plead guilty and
waive his right to a trial is an informed one.' 5 The Supreme Court
has held that a failure to comply with Rule 11 requires that a defendant having pled guilty be allowed to plead anew.' 6 An element was
added by the Supreme Court when they required that the record must
affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his
plea understandingly and voluntarily. 17 In 1966 the "factual basis"
test was also added to Rule 11 requiring that the judge be satisfied
that there are circumstances that show guilt.' 8 The courts have always
had the discretion within the mandate of Rule 11 to refuse to accept a
guilty plea. The Supreme Court has commented on the discretion
and stated that the defendant has no absolute right to have his guilty
plea accepted. 19 The Court inferred that even if a judge accepted a
a
guilty plea when there was evidence before the court which showed
20
error.
constitutional
no
be
probably
would
there
defense,
valid
The waivers under a guilty plea must be valid under the Due Process Clause, 21 therefore the "voluntary and intelligent" test applies to
both federal and state proceedings. 22 This determination under "voluntary and intelligent" has caused the courts much confusion because
of the inexactability of the terms; each case being decided on its own
facts. As stated in Brady v. United States, "the voluntariness of a
14 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. It was amended in 1966 to include the requirement that the
court address the defendant personally to determine whether he understands the consequences of his plea. But see Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S. Ct. 1498, 23 L.
Ed.2d 16 (1969) holding the requirement was nonretroactive.
15 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed.2d 747 (1970).
16 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed.2d 418 (1969). But
see Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S. Ct. 1490, 23 L. Ed.2d 16 (1969) holding
the McCarthy rule was not retroactive.
17 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L. Ed.2d 274, 279 (1969).
The Supreme Court has not yet passed on the question of the retroactivity of this new
requirement.
18 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. See United States v. Steele, 413 F.2d 967, 969 (2d Cir. 1969); United
States v. Tucker, 425 F.2d 624, 629 (4th Cir. 1970).
19 Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1072, 8 L. Ed.2d 211, 220 (1962).
21 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S. Ct. 510, 7 L. Ed.2d 473 (1962);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed.2d 763 (1970).
22 See also, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (1966):

If the defendant pleads guilty, or enters a plea of nolo contendere he shall be admonished by the court of the consequences; and neither of such pleas shall be received
unless it plainly appears that he is sane, and is uninfluenced by any consideration of
fear, or by any persuasion, or delusive hope of pardon, prompting him to confess his
guilt.
The duty imposed by the Texas statutes is mandatory, and performance is a condition
precedent to the validity of such a plea and failure to perform may be raised after conviction. Braggs v. State, 334 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
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[guilty] plea can be determined only by considering all the relevant
circumstances surrounding it."23
In analyzing the circumstances and factors motivating a guilty plea
there is only one rigid rule; that if the defendant has entered a plea
of guilty without counsel and without having validly waived the right
to counsel, the plea is invalid, based on the assumption that it was
not knowingly made. 24 If a defendant has been represented by counsel
when he entered a plea, the inadequacy of such counsel can be a basis
for attacking a guilty plea as invalid.2 5 The counsel's conduct must
be such that would "shock the conscience of the court and make the
proceeding a farce and mockery of justice. '26 In McMann v. Richardson 2 7 the Supreme Court held that if the attorney commits an "ordinary error" (misjudged the admissibility of a confession) it would not
be grounds for collateral attack. The mere presence of counsel representing the defendant at time of pleading will mitigate against a later
claim of an invalid guilty plea since the courts are reluctant to hold
that counsel has been incompetent or ineffective. 2 There are other
factors a court will consider when applying the "voluntary and intelligent" test to determine the validity of a guilty plea. If the defendant's
mental faculties were so impaired by drugs when he pleaded this could
be grounds for reversal.2 9 Proof of insanity would of necessity render a
guilty plea invalid since the defendant would not be capable of making
an "intelligent" choice. Presently, if no evidence of insanity is offered
the trial court does not have to hear evidence regarding sanity. 0
Threats may affect the "voluntary" nature of the plea but it must be
shown that there existed mental coercion overbearing the will of the
petitioner.3 1 Knowledge of the maximum punishment a defendant
may be assessed under the charge is held to be a requisite for an "in32
telligent" plea.

23 397 U.S. 742, 749. 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L. Ed.2d 747, 757, (1970), citing Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1343, 10 L. Ed.2d 513 (1963).
24 See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S. Ct. 1050, 10 L. Ed.2d 193 (1963); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed.2d 747 (1970).
25 See Brady v. United States, 897 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed.2d 747 (1970).
26 United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950,
70 S. Ct. 478, 94 L. Ed. 586 (1949).
27 397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1450, 25 L. Ed.2d 763, 775 (1970).
28 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed.2d 763 (1970).
29 Sander v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 10 L. Ed.2d 148 (1963). See also
Schnautz v, Beto, 416 F.2d 214, 215 (1969); Manley v. United States, 396 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.
1968). But such are usually found voluntary. See Falu v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1051
(D.C. N.Y. 1969), afl'd 421 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1970).
3o Parrish v. State, 339 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960); Gallery v. State, 400 S.W.2d
751 (rex. Crim. App. 1966).
81 Crow v. United States, 397 F.2d 284 (10th Cir. 1968). But see Roberts v. Virginia, 317
F. Supp. 1311 (W.D. Va. 1970) where counsel informed client that he could guarantee him
nothing less than thirty years if he insisted on jury trial but eighteen years for a guilty
plea and court held such plea was valid.
32 Freeman v. United States, 350 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1965). But an accused need not be
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The courts have held a guilty plea is not rendered invalid on claims
of coercion merely because it is the result of a plea bargaining situation.3 3 The appellate courts have generally used the defendant's trial
court statement that the plea was voluntary, and not because of promises, to sustain the guilty plea. A more realistic approach was taken by

the Court in United States v. Tweedy3 4 when it noted that a defendant
would probably not say anything about the bargaining because he
might think "that this was all part of the game, and that honest answers
would destroy the deal." 3 5
Prior guilty pleas have also been attacked on grounds that they
should have been withdrawn when the pleas were induced by illegal
evidence or unconstitutional statutes contending that the plea could
not have been voluntarily and knowingly made under the circumstances. However, three recent Supreme Court decisions36 stand for
the proposition that such pleas may nevertheless be "voluntary and
intelligent." This places the burden on petitioner to show the plea
was "substantially motivated" by the illegal evidence or statute. Thus,
informed about every conceivable collateral effect the conviction entered on the plea might
have. See, e.g., Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
916, 85 S. Ct. 902, 13 L. Ed.2d 801 (1965). There are contra views whether ineligibility of
parole is a consequence of the plea about which the defendant must be informed. Holding
affirmatively: Jenkins v. United States, 420 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1970); Durant v. United
States, 410 F.2d 689 (lst Cir. 1969). Holding contra: Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436
(D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 957, 84 S. Ct. 978, 11 L. Ed.2d 975 (1964). But even
if the record is silent, it may be shown that the defendant knew the maximum punishment
from other sources such as his bondsman or relative. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,
considered this problem and the interesting question arose as to whether the defendant's
attorney can testify that he informed his client and whether this would violate the attorney-client privilege. With strong dissent, the court held the attorney could testify.
United States v. Woodall, No. 28352 (5th Cir., Feb. 24, 1971). The court, citing Alford,
also held that where defendant was told the maximum penalty, which later was found to
be less than advised, the plea was still voluntary since the probability defendant would not
change his plea outweighed the possibility the heavier sentence would cause him to
change. The court expressly overruled its two recent decisions on the subject: Grant v.
United States, 424 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1970); Stephen v. United States, 426 F.2d 257 (5th
Cir. 1970) which held contra.
33 Putman v. United States, 337 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1964); Schnautz v. Beto, 416 F.2d
214, 216 (5th Cir. 1969). Contra, United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957), where
court allowed a plea to be withdrawn when evidence showed prosecutor promised leniency. But, as stated in United States v. Weese, 145 F.2d 135, 136 (2d Cir. 1945) the courts
fear that if they allow guilty pleas to be withdrawn every time a defendant claims he was
promised leniency, defendants will "indulge in a plea of guilt as a mere trial balloon to
test the attitude of the trial judge" and withdraw plea if not satisfied. The Supreme Court
has not decided the constitutionality of plea bargaining at this time. See generally, Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968); Note, The
Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining,83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970); Note, Plea Bargaining-Justice of the Record, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 430 (1970).
84 419 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1969).
85 Id. at 193.
86 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed.2d 747 (1970). Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S. Ct. 1458, 25 L. Ed.2d 785 (1970) and McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed.2d 763 (1970) both holding that even if
defendant's counsel was wrong in assessment of the admissibility of a confession, it does
not follow that his error and the illegal confession were sufficient to render the plea unintelligent.
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an alleged violation of constitutional rights is simply another factor
to be taken into consideration in determining the voluntariness of the
plea;87 and does not render the judgment invalid per se since the conviction is based on the plea itself and not on the evidence.38 In Brady
v. United States,3 9 a case similar to the instant case, the Supreme Court
considered a situation where the defendant's counsel advised him that
if he was convicted it would be possible for the jury to impose the
death penalty, but if he pleaded guilty, the maximum penalty would be
life imprisonment. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the
plea was "intelligently" made and the statute did not necessarily prove
that the plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act. 40 In considering guilty pleas, the Supreme Court stated:
Central to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment
against the defendant is the defendant's admission in 4open court
that he committed the acts charged in the indictment. '
Subsequently it was shown in United States v. Jackson42 that this advice
was legally incorrect since such statutes with differentiation of punishment were held unconstitutional.
One issue confronting state and lower federal courts is whether a guilty
plea can be valid when it is accompanied by a simultaneous claim of
innocence; since on its face a claim of innocence is also a pleading of
not guilty. Some jurisdictions authorize the acceptance of a guilty plea
only where guilt is professed. 43 Other jurisdictions take the position
that it is entirely within the discretion of the trial judge and decline
44
to rule definitely that such pleas must be either accepted or rejected.
However, some courts take the position that such inconsistent pleas
are acceptable and valid on the basis that a court should not force any
defense on a defendant. Since the results of a defense and jury trial
may be more severe than punishment under a guilty plea, the courts
87 Id. See also, United States ex. rel. Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1016, 1021 (2d Cir. 1969).

88 "A conviction after a plea of guilty normally rests on the defendant's own admission
in open court that he committed the acts with which he is charged." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1446, 25 L. Ed.2d 763, 770 (1970), citing Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L. Ed.2d 747, 756 (1970); McCarthy
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L. Ed.2d 418, 425 (1969).
39 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed.2d 747 (1970).
40 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed.2d 747 (1970).
41 Id. at 748, 90 S. Ct. at 1468, 25 L. Ed.2d at 756 (emphasis added).
42 390 U.S. 570, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 20 L. Ed.2d 138 (1968). The basis for the Court's holding
was that the operative effect of the capital punishment provision was "to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the
Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial." Id. at 581, 88 S. Ct. at 1216, 20 L. Ed.2d
at 147.
43 Hulsey v. United States, 369 F.2d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1966). Texas requires that the
defendant state he is guilty or the court will not accept a guilty plea. Luna v. State, 436
S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
44 Maxwell v. United States, 368 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1966).
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feel that the defendant should be left with the choice.4 5 It has been
stated that the mere assertion of innocence is insufficient to compel
withdrawal of a guilty plea once entered. The absence of an
assertion
46
of innocence can be a factor against granting withdrawal.
In the instant case, North Carolinav. A lford,47 the defendant claimed
his prior plea of guilty was invalid. He contended that the plea was
the product of fear and coercion because if he pled innocent the jury
might assess the death penalty. Defendant also claimed he was denied
effective assistance of counsel prior to pleading guilty and, that his
simultaneous claim of innocence should negate his plea.4 The Supreme Court, in accord with past decisions, restated the basic test of a
valid guilty plea:
The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of
49
action open to the defendant.
Regarding the alleged coercion caused by the death penalty provision,
the Court restated and extended its prior holding in Brady. 0
[A] plea of guilty which would not have been entered except for
the defendant's desire to avoid a possible death penalty and to
limit the maximum penalty to life imprisonment or a term of years
was not for that reason compelled within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.... That he would not have pleaded except for the

opportunity to limit the possible penalty does not necessarily
demonstrate that the plea of guilty was not the product of a free
and rational choice. .... 51

45 Quillien v. Leeke, 303 F. Supp. 698 (D.C. Conn. 1969); Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d
1378 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
46 See generally, Annot., "Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere, Before Sentence, Under Rule 32(d) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," 6 A.L.R. Fed. 665 (1971).
Nolo contendere pleas have always been acceptable to the court although such pleas are
not by definition considered an actual admittance of guilt in most courts. See, Hudson v.
United States, 272 U.S. 451, 47 S. Ct. 127, 71 L. Ed. 347 (1926). See, e.g., Lott v. United
States, 367 U.S. 421, 81 S. Ct. 1563, 6 L. Ed.2d 940 (1961).
47 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed.2d 162 (1970). Alford was noted approvingly in
Dawson v. Wainwright, No. 30027 (5th Cir., Feb. 24, 1971), where defendant stated "Well
I'm not guilty but I'm going to plead guilty . . . but I mean, I'd plead guilty . . . rather
than see my wife and family killed, I will." Defendant's family had been threatened if he
testified who actually did the killing in the robbery in which he took part-which would
be necessary if he pleaded innocent. Held-voluntary plea.
48 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed.2d 162 (1970).
49 Id. at -, 91 S. Ct. at 163, 27 L. Ed.2d at 166. Counsel, in court, asked the defendant
if he still wanted to plead guilty and defendant answered "Well, I'm still pleading that
you all got me to plead guilty. I plead the other way, circumstantial evidence; that the
jury will prosecute me on-on the second. You told me to plead guilty, right. I don'tI'm not guilty but I plead guilty."
50 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed.2d 747 (1970).
51 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, -, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed.2d 162, 167
(1970), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed.2d 274 (1969);
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S. Ct. 510, 7 L. Ed.2d 473 (1962); Kercheval
v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 47 S. Ct. 582, 71 L. Ed. 1009 (1927).
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CASE NOTES

Thus, a plea of guilty may be valid even though encouraged by an
unconsitutional statute.
The Supreme Court used the definition and case history of the nolo
contendere plea as their basis for holding that a guilty plea with a
contemporaneous claim of innocence may still be valid. Justice White,
delivering the opinion, stated:
The fact that his plea was denominated a plea of guilty rather than
a plea of nolo contendere is of no constitutional significance with
respect to the issue now before us, for the Constitution is concerned with the practical consequences, not the formal categorizations of state law .... Nor can we perceive any material difference

between a plea which refuses to admit commission of the criminal
act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence when, as in
the instant case, a defendant intelligently concludes that his
interest require entry of a guilty plea ....52
The Court stressed all the circumstances that have been considered
in the past when applying the "voluntary and intelligent" test. The
Court made it clear that there was no one factor that made the defendant's guilty plea valid but noted: that the defendant was represented
by effective counsel; that there was a strong factual basis for the plea;
that the trial court had questioned and admonished the defendant;
and that coercion did not exist. It was only because of the combination
of all these affirmative elements that the Court found the plea to be
voluntary.
It has been estimated that eighty-five to ninety per cent of all convictions occurring annually in federal courts are based upon pleas of
guilty or nolo contendere, 3 and that an attack by a prisoner upon the
validity of his guilty plea is a problem that is coming before the courts
more and more frequently. The judiciary have had a problem attempting to minimize the risk of wasted effort involved in separating
bona fide petitions from those presenting a "construct of the fertile
brains of defense lawyers without counterpart in reality."' The Alford
52 400 U.S. 25, -, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed.2d 162, 171 (1970), (citations omitted).
53 ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, Tent. Dr.
1967. pp. 1-2. Brady v. United States stated some of the advantages of a guilty plea:
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious-his exposure is reduced, the
correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages-the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt . ...
397 U.S. 742, 751, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1471, 25 L. Ed.2d 747, 758 (1970).
54 United States ex. rel. Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1016, 1041 (2d Cir. 1969), (Chief
Justice Friendly's dissenting opinion). See generally, Diamond v. United States, 432 F.2d
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